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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 2016, the headlines of major publications began 
announcing that Donald Trump had successfully completed a “hostile 
takeover” of the Republican Party.1 What was meant by this claim, it 
appears, is that Trump had replaced the Grand Old Party’s commitment to 
free markets, balanced budgets, and low taxes with promises of “universal 
health-care, tax hikes on hedge-fund managers, and a $1 trillion 
infrastructure plan.”2 And rather than finding himself a dissenter within a 
party that rejected his views, Trump instead skyrocketed to the top of the 
party, which accordingly transformed itself to accommodate him. Whether 
this appraisal is accurate or not,3 it reflects concern about the associational 
 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor 
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Chris Lund for early encouragement 
and advice on this paper and to Chad Flanders for thoughtful feedback and suggestions. Many thanks 
also to John Inazu, Daniel Epps, and the Washington University Law Review students. 
1. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, Donald Trump’s Not-So-Hostile Takeover of the GOP, INTELLIGENCER 
(Dec. 24, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/trump-takeover-gop-impeachment-prescripti 
on-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/3KLX-Q5DZ]; Joe Scarborough, Opinion, Donald Trump’s Hostile 
Takeover of the Republican Party, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/01/donald-trumps-hostile-takeover-of-the-republican-party/ [https 
://perma.cc/MA78-RXMX]; Ryan Lizza, Donald Trump’s Hostile Takeover of the G.O.P., NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trumps-hostile-take 
over-of-the-g-o-p [https://perma.cc/9THA-JQR2]. 
2. Levitz, supra note 1. 












integrity of a voluntary private organization—the Republican Party—and it 
suggests that some forms of organizational transformation could be 
problematic.  
The same concern might arise regarding other private associations, 
including religious associations. Of course, all organizations undergo 
change. Notwithstanding stereotypical assumptions about religious 
organizations as ossified and impermeable to change, reform and 
transformation are endemic to religious communities, which inevitably 
partake in “an ongoing, dynamic relationship with the realities of everyday 
life.”4 Often, change occurs because of external events or pressures, which 
lead to internal disputes and, perhaps, the organization adopting new 
leadership and new values. For example, debates over pressing social issues 
such as slavery in the nineteenth century and same-sex marriage in the 
twenty-first century have permeated religious communities, leading 
ultimately to changed beliefs and sometimes schisms within congregations.5 
Given that some transformation is inevitable and universal within religious 
and other voluntary organizations, it would be unwarranted to assume that 
all change within a religious organization that touches on the structure or 
teachings of that religion is necessarily problematic.  
Moreover, it might appear at first glance that outsiders to those 
organizations—including the government—have no interest in either 
encouraging or discouraging such change. But perhaps the matter is not so 
simple. In fact, several constitutional doctrines appear to be aimed at 
protecting against some forms of organizational transformation, particularly 
for religious organizations. Yet, courts applying those doctrines rarely ask 
some of the difficult questions underlying this concern for associational 
integrity. For example, when does organizational transformation constitute 
 
4. Robert Orsi, Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion, in LIVED RELIGION IN 
AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF PRACTICE 3, 7 (David D. Hall ed., 1997); see also id. at 11–12 
(describing an incorrect view of religion as “a phenomenon of closure and stasis”); Madhavi Sunder, 
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1423 (2003) [hereinafter Sunder, Veil] (“While traditional 
theories of religion as a sphere of injustice held religious beliefs to be unchanging, contemporary 
theorists argue that, in fact, religion is much more internally contested and subject to reasoned argument 
and change than earlier theorists acknowledged.”); Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites, Catholics and the 
Constitution: Developing Church Doctrine, Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION 3, 9 (2005) (“Church doctrine is a living organism. It responds to challenges across time and 
cultures.”). Professor Kelly notes that Roman Catholic scholars are somewhat resistant to the notion that 
Church teachings, which are labeled “infallible,” can subsequently change; change has, however, 
occurred with regularity. Id. at 9–21. 
5. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 690–91 (1871); Meg Anderson, United Methodist 














a “hostile takeover”? And why, exactly, is this form of transformation a 
cause for concern?  
This Article aims to grapple with these difficult questions about the 
meaning of hostile takeover, as well as about whether the state should care 
about it—that is, whether the state should ever act either to prevent or to 
encourage hostile takeover. Part I of this Article attempts to define hostile 
takeover in the context of religious organizations and compares it to the 
concept of hostile takeover in some secular contexts. Part II then considers 
what the position of the state should be vis-à-vis hostile takeover of religious 
organizations. This Article ultimately concludes that the state has only a 
very limited interest in either the facilitation or the prevention of hostile 
takeover. 
I. DEFINING HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
The first task of this paper is to define the concept of “hostile takeover.” 
As explained in Part I.A., the term “hostile takeover” was first used by the 
Supreme Court in the context of religious organizations in the 2010 case 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law v. Martinez.6 While that case dealt primarily with 
freedom of speech and association, rather than religious freedom, I argue in 
Part I.B. that the concept of hostile takeover plays a broader role in both 
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause doctrines, as well as in other 
First Amendment contexts. Finally, Part I.C. highlights some fundamental 
questions about the scope and meaning of hostile takeover. 
A. CLS v. Martinez 
The U.S. Supreme Court introduced the concept of “hostile takeover” in 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law v. Martinez, which involved a challenge by a student 
chapter of the national organization Christian Legal Society (CLS) to a 
public law school’s nondiscrimination policy requiring Registered Student 
Organizations (RSOs), which enjoyed certain benefits from the university, 
to accept any student who wished to join as a member or seek a leadership 
 
6. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). “Hostile takeover” in the context of religious and other voluntary 
associations borrows from the concept of hostile takeover in the corporate law context. In corporate law, 
a hostile takeover is generally defined as a corporate acquisition that takes place without the consent of 
the target company’s board of directors. See, e.g., Bradley R. Aronstam, The Interplay of Blasius and 
Unocal—A Compelling Problem Justifying the Call for Substantial Change, 81 OR. L. REV. 429, 433–
34, 434 n.21 (2002). In this Article, the term “hostile takeover” is used in a slightly different sense, to 













position within the organization.7 This condition posed a problem for CLS, 
because it embraced very specific views about marriage and sexuality, 
including a belief that homosexuality was immoral.8 Because the 
organization’s rules required members to sign an affirmation of faith and 
excluded those who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct,” it could 
not comply with the so-called “all-comers” policy and was consequently 
excluded from the benefits of being an RSO (although it was still permitted 
to operate and use some of the school’s resources).9 While continuing to 
function outside of the RSO system, CLS also brought suit against the 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, claiming that the 
school’s enforcement of the policy against it violated CLS’s rights of free 
speech, expressive association, and religious free exercise.10  
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the case revolved primarily around CLS’s 
free-speech claim, which the Court ultimately rejected. The Court found that 
the law school’s RSO program constituted a “limited public forum” for 
speech.11 As such, the Court held that the law school’s policy only had to be 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral in order to be constitutional.12 The Court 
found that the policy met both requirements.13 It then made quick work of 
CLS’s other two claims. The Court first subsumed the expressive-
association claim under the free-speech claim.14 Then, almost in passing, it 
dismissed the free-exercise claim because, under Employment Division v. 
Smith, the policy was neutral and generally applicable and therefore 
constitutional.15  
Because CLS involved the student organization context and the issue of 
what sort of support or recognition from the law school CLS would receive, 
Hastings’s policy was subject to a lower level of scrutiny than the Court 
would have applied to governmental interference with a freestanding 
association. In other words, in CLS v. Martinez, the student organization 
was seeking financial and other forms of support from the law school, which 
 
7. CLS, 561 U.S. at 675. The policy as written simply forbids discrimination “on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.” Id. at 670. 
However, the parties stipulated earlier in the litigation that the effect of this policy was to “allow any 
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of 
[her] status or beliefs,” and the Supreme Court treated that stipulation as binding. Id. at 675–76 
(alteration in original). 
8. Id. at 672. 
9. Id. at 672–73. 
10. Id. at 673. 
11. Id. at 682. 
12. Id. at 685. 
13. Id. at 697. 
14. Id. at 680–83. 












gave the law school greater control over its policies.16 The decision in CLS 
should not, therefore, be taken to mean that the state would be similarly free 
to impose a comparable membership policy on religious groups outside of 
school walls.17 
The concern about hostile takeover was raised by CLS in its principal 
brief. As CLS explained, the all-comers rule burdened its ability to “control 
and present its message,” because it could not prevent students who oppose 
that message from joining the group and diluting or undermining that 
message publicly.18 “If non-Christians could walk in and insist on taking a 
turn leading one of CLS’s weekly studies of the Bible—a book whose 
interpretation is not free from controversy,” CLS explained, “those 
meetings would cease to be an expression of CLS’s beliefs . . . .”19 The 
majority opinion in CLS largely dismissed this possibility as “more 
hypothetical than real,” noting that there had been no “history or prospect 
of RSO hijackings at” the law school.20 Justice Kennedy, who concurred, 
similarly noted that there was no evidence of such a phenomenon, but he 
suggested that this would be a different case—a “substantial” one—if the 
policy were “either designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its 
leadership in order to stifle its views,” or if the all-comers policy had the 
“purpose or effect” of facilitating such takeover.21 CLS, however, argued 
that because of the all-comers policy,  
[e]ither no outsiders will join CLS, in which case the College’s Policy 
is essentially symbolic and does not serve any concrete legitimate 
purpose, or the opposite: Heterodox or hostile students will join and 
seek to assume leadership positions, in which case CLS’s message 
will be distorted, and quite possibly sabotaged.22  
Justice Alito’s dissent took CLS’s suggestion far more seriously, while 
acknowledging that it was not his primary concern.23 Specifically, Justice 
Alito worried that “[a] true accept-all-comers policy permits small 
unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to change the views 
that the group expresses,” presumably because larger groups, which are by 
 
16. Id. at 680–83. 
17. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that application of 
a nondiscrimination law that would force the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster, in contravention 
of its beliefs, unconstitutionally infringes the Scouts’ freedom of association). 
18. Brief for Petitioner at 30–31, CLS, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 711183, at *30–
31. 
19. Id. at 30. 
20. CLS, 561 U.S. at 692. 
21. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at *31. 












definition more popular, would be harder for a small group of committed 
antagonists to dominate.24 He also criticized Justice Kennedy’s caveat as 
incoherent and difficult to apply: “The Court holds that the accept-all-
comers policy is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes 
of the RSO forum. How could those characteristics be altered by a change 
in the membership of one of the forum’s registered groups? No explanation 
is apparent.”25 In other words, according to Justice Alito, the imagined 
change in membership does not make the all-comers policy any less 
viewpoint-neutral, and it does not make it any less reasonable in relation to 
the purposes of the limited public form.26 
Justice Alito also acknowledged that hostile takeover will not necessarily 
be self-evident from the group’s change in membership, or from any other 
objectively verifiable factors. For example, Justice Alito described a 
hypothetical scenario in which students who are hostile to the group’s 
message “joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views, ended the 
group’s affiliation with the national organization, and changed the group’s 
message.”27 Does this constitute hostile takeover or simply normal and 
healthy change in the group’s identity through prescribed organizational 
channels? In Justice Alito’s elegant formulation, “[w]hether a change 
represents reform or transformation may depend very much on the eye of 
the beholder.”28  
The concern about hostile takeover thus appears to focus not so much on 
the autonomy of the organization to choose its own leaders and shape its 
own message without government interference—a concern that was surely 
at the center of CLS’s claims—but rather on the integrity of the 
organization. An interest in autonomy is an interest in conducting one’s own 
affairs independently of intervention from the state.29 An interest in 
associational or organizational integrity, as the term is used here, is an 
organization’s interest in maintaining its existing identity, mission, or 
message. It is a concern about preventing hostile takeover that results in a 
change in the structure or beliefs of the association. As this Article argues, 
protecting institutional autonomy may have the effect of protecting 
institutional integrity, but that is not always the case. In some cases, 
 
24. Id. Justice Alito noted that CLS had only seven members one year, so it would not take very 
many hostile students to join that group and overwhelm its prior membership. Id. at 740. 
25. Id. at 740. 
26. Perhaps Justice Kennedy was viewing the “reasonableness” prong of the test as the tool that 
courts could use to strike down policies having the purpose or effect of facilitating hostile takeover. 
27. CLS, 561 U.S. at 740 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
28. Id. 
29. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of 












enforcing a “hands-off” stance for the state with respect to religious 
institutions may actually facilitate hostile takeover.  
Indeed, interestingly, the lawsuit itself came about precisely because the 
group, which had previously been known as the Hastings Christian Legal 
Society or the Hastings Christian Fellowship, underwent a significant 
change in its governing structure and rules not long before the conflict with 
Hastings’s policy arose.30 As explained by the district court, during the 
2003-2004 academic year, the organization had approximately five to seven 
regular members, one of whom was openly gay and two others of whom did 
not subscribe to “orthodox” Christian beliefs.31 Then, the court explained, 
at the end of that academic year, three new students took on leadership roles 
in the organization, two of whom decided to affiliate the organization with 
the national Christian Legal Society.32 That affiliation brought with it a 
requirement that all members sign the Statement of Faith and conform to 
CLS’s code of conduct, including the aforementioned prescriptions about 
sexual morality.33 This history raises the obvious question of which scenario 
represents a hostile takeover: the actual series of events leading the student 
group to adopt the Statement of Faith and code of conduct prescribed by the 
national CLS, or the hypothetical scenario in which a group of students 
takes back the group’s identity by cutting off its affiliation with the national 
organization? 
One final point should be highlighted before moving on from this 
discussion of CLS v. Martinez. Whether the decision was correct or 
incorrect—and there is ample commentary on both sides of that debate34—
it does not address a much harder question lurking within the case. 
Specifically, while focused on discrimination against gays and lesbians, the 
 
30. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Kane, No. C 
04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006), aff’d, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 
2009), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. 
of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
31. Id. at *3. 
32. Id.; see also CLS, 561 U.S. at 672. The joint stipulation of the parties further noted that 
“[t]hese [three] individuals assumed leadership informally and no formal vote of the [organization’s] 
membership was taken to elect them.” Joint Stipulation of Facts for Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment at 9, CLS, 2006 WL 997217 (No. 3:04-cv-04484-JSW). 
33. CLS, 2006 WL 997217, at *2. 
34. See, e.g., Sarah J. Kurfis, Note, In Defense of the Hostile Takeover: A Move Towards More 
Democratic Student Organizations in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 457 
(2013); Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More Fair: On CLS v. Martinez and First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 235, 235 (2012) (“[T]he Martinez reasoning and result make 
the best of a jurisprudence that has lost its moorings.”); Zachary R. Cormier, Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez: The Death Knell of Associational Freedom on the College Campus, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 287 (2011) (criticizing the decision for erasing associational rights); Richard A. Epstein, Church 
and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 110 












Court did not directly engage with the fact that a nondiscrimination rule 
forbidding discrimination on various protected grounds, including religion, 
forces religious organizations to accept members, and even leaders, who do 
not share the group’s doctrinal beliefs. This possibility, which is implicit in 
the Court’s rejection of the hostile takeover scenario, unquestionably 
imposes a unique burden on religious organizations, unlike those imposed 
on secular groups for whom religious discrimination is not central to their 
message. Of course, the decision to ignore this issue can be explained by 
the Court’s decision to accept the parties’ stipulation that the 
nondiscrimination policy was actually an all-comers policy. However, the 
possibility of enforcing religious nondiscrimination policies against 
religious groups raises significant questions at the heart of the idea of hostile 
takeover.  
Consider, for example, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. 
University of Iowa,35 a case decided after CLS that involved the claim of a 
Christian student organization that the university’s anti-discrimination 
policy violated its First Amendment rights.36 The organization argued that 
its religious free exercise rights were violated by the university rule 
providing that it could not discriminate on the basis of religion, even in 
selecting its leaders. As the group explained, InterVarsity’s “officers are its 
religious leaders who minister to its members, personify its beliefs, and play 
an important role in conveying InterVarsity’s religious message and 
carrying out its religious mission;” thus, interfering with the group’s ability 
to select its own leaders is tantamount to undermining the group’s “right to 
shape its own faith and mission.”37 As discussed below, at the heart of the 
concept of hostile takeover is a concern about attacking a group’s mission 
and message by interfering with its leadership and membership policies in 
a way that encourages or enables outsiders to shape those policies, and 
InterVarsity arguably represents one scenario in which courts may actually 
wish to avoid facilitating a hostile takeover. 
B. Hostile Takeover Outside of CLS 
The fear of hostile takeover is admittedly not central to the reasoning or 
holding in the CLS case itself. Antipathy toward the scenario it describes, 
however, may be understood to ground various First Amendment doctrines 
 
35. 408 F. Supp. 3d 960 (S.D. Iowa 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-3389 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2019). 
36. Id. at 960. 
37. Id. at 985 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 188–89 (2012)). The district court in InterVarsity rejected the group’s free exercise claim, however, 
finding that it was subject only to the same public-forum analysis as the group’s free-speech and free-












in differing contexts. Fundamentally, the concern about hostile takeover 
may be understood to reflect the fact that an organization’s membership and 
(especially) its leadership not only convey but also help to constitute its 
message; the group’s messengers embody its message, and the group must 
be free to ensure that those it has chosen to carry its message are doing so 
effectively.38 As Chad Flanders explains, a group’s leader is its “‘standard-
bearer’ or ‘ambassador.’”39 Thus, “[i]f the [group] loses control of who gets 
to lead it, the meaning of that group is in jeopardy.”40 Both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause have been mobilized in various 
contexts to protect associational integrity against hostile takeover by 
outsiders. 
1. Other Religion Clauses Contexts 
Numerous doctrines purport to protect religious organizations against 
being forced to accept members who do not share, and may undermine, their 
message. Of course, the Religion Clauses reflect numerous values and 
purposes,41 and I do not mean to claim that institutional integrity is the sole 
or even primary one. Rather, this Article makes the more modest claim that 
one thread running through various Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause cases is a concern about preventing the takeover of religious 
institutions by those who do not share their missions and beliefs.  
Most obviously, the ministerial exception, which is dictated by both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, exempts religious institutions 
from lawsuits based on the hiring and firing of their ministers—a category 
of employee that is ill-defined but assumes some religious functions and 
some measure of leadership within the organization.42 As Justice Alito, the 
author of the principal dissent in CLS, stated in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
 
38. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–56 (2000) (“The presence of an avowed 
homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different 
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with 
Boy Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not 
the other.”); Chad Flanders, Religious Organizations and the Analogy to Political Parties, in THE RISE 
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 103, 105 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). 
39. Flanders, supra note 38, at 105. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We 
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 855 & n.117 (2009) [hereinafter Garnett, Hands-Off 
Approach]. 
42. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012); 
id. at 192 (weighing “the formal title given . . . by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, [the 
employee’s] own use of that title, and the important religious functions [the employee] performed for 
the Church” in determining that a particular employee was a minister); see also Morrissey-Berru v. Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–61 (9th Cir.) (outlining factors for determining when 












Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, “a religious body’s right to self-
governance must include the ability to select, and to be selective about, 
those who will serve as the very ‘embodiment of its message’ and ‘its voice 
to the faithful.’”43 Were it otherwise, a woman who wished to be a Roman 
Catholic priest—or, more troublingly, a woman who wished only to 
challenge Roman Catholic doctrine—could presumably sue the church 
under sex discrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, for 
its refusal to hire her.44  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also exempts religious 
organizations from claims of religious discrimination, even when the 
employee is performing non-religious functions.45 In a case involving a 
custodial worker who was fired from his job at a gymnasium run by the 
Mormon Church because of his failure to meet the requirements for church 
membership, the U.S. Supreme Court not only held that the Title VII 
exemption allowing religious employers to hire and fire on the basis of 
religion did not violate the Establishment Clause, but also suggested that it 
might be required, at least in part, by the Free Exercise Clause—that is, the 
Court suggested that religious employers were constitutionally entitled to 
an exemption from the anti-discrimination laws with respect to those 
employees who were hired to perform religious functions.46 Moreover, the 
Court observed, if courts were able to require religious organizations to hire 
those who did not share their beliefs for non-religious jobs—and to decide 
which jobs were religious or non-religious, “[f]ear of potential liability 
might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its 
religious mission.”47 Thus, outside the public university student 
 
43. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 201 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
44. Id. at 189; cf. Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, Apostolic Letter of Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of 
the Catholic Church on Reserving Priestly Ordination to Men Alone (May 22, 1994), http://www.vatican 
.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19940522_ordinatio-sacerdotali 
s.html [https://perma.cc/U5LD-VVAM] (explaining the Roman Catholic church’s rationale for limiting 
the priesthood to men). Of course, this is a far-fetched scenario; it is hard to imagine such an individual 
who is otherwise qualified for the job of religious leader seeking a position purely in order to undermine 
the rules of the church. The more common scenario in ministerial-exception cases is that the religious 
organization does not officially discriminate on the protected ground, but is claimed to have violated its 
own rules by discriminating in the plaintiff’s case. Jessie Hill, Ties that Bind? The Questionable Consent 
Justification for Hosanna-Tabor, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 563, 574 (2015) (discussing Egan v. Hamline 
United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), in which a Methodist church 
allegedly fired its music director for being gay, in violation of church rules). 
45. “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society 
of its activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018). 
46. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 335–36 (1987).  












organizations context in which CLS arose, religious organizations enjoy 
greater protection from hostile takeover and are even constitutionally 
entitled to prevent those who do not share their beliefs from performing core 
religious functions.48  
The so-called church property cases, in which the Supreme Court has 
largely decided not to decide disputes over church property when doctrinal 
questions are implicated, appear to cut the other way with respect to 
institutional integrity, while foregrounding the importance of institutional 
autonomy. For example, both Watson v. Jones49 and Presbyterian Church 
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church50 involved disputes over religious doctrine in which one faction of 
the Presbyterian church, embracing doctrinal views that differed from the 
traditional views, sought recognition, as well as the control of church 
property, as the “true” church. In Watson, two factions within the church 
had differed over the issue of slavery in relation to church teachings; in 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, the controversy revolved around the decision to 
ordain women and to take positions on social issues of the day.51 In both 
cases, the situation could be characterized as a hostile takeover of the church 
by a particular faction. The Court’s decision not to intervene in each case 
reflected, at least in part, an Establishment-Clause-related concern that 
courts should avoid intervening in doctrinal disputes.52 Courts’ hesitancy to 
delve into doctrinal disputes usually entails that they cannot take sides in a 
hostile takeover situation. Thus, the Court’s embrace of institutional 
autonomy, as well as its insistence that courts should not decide 
ecclesiastical questions, was in tension with any interest it might have had 
in preserving institutional integrity. 
The 1976 Supreme Court case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for 
the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich53 illustrates the tension between 
 
48. Because Amos dealt directly only with the question whether the Title VII exemption for 
religious discrimination violated the Establishment Clause—particularly because it allowed such 
discrimination against employees performing religious as well as non-religious (e.g., custodial) duties—
that case did not discuss the extent to which the Free Exercise Clause might or might not require religious 
employers be allowed to discriminate against employees performing non-religious functions. 
49. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
50. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
51. Watson, 80 U.S. at 684; Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 442 & n.1; see generally 
Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious 
Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1652–58 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, Assimilation]. 
52. Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1655. Watson was decided before the Establishment 
Clause was incorporated against the states, so it did not expressly rely on the Establishment Clause, but 
it was later understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court to rely on First Amendment principles. 
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115–16 
(1952). 












institutional autonomy and institutional integrity with particular acuity. 
Milivojevich centered on a dispute between the Serbian Mother Church and 
its North American diocese over the removal of a U.S. bishop and the 
reorganization of the diocese into three separate dioceses.54 The diocese 
claimed that the bishop’s removal and the diocesan reorganization were 
both improper under binding church rules, and the Illinois Supreme Court 
ultimately agreed, ordering the bishop’s reinstatement and invalidating the 
reorganization.55 The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed, holding that the 
state court had violated the First Amendment by “impermissibl[y] 
reject[ing] . . . the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this 
hierarchical church . . . and impermissibly substitut[ing] its own inquiry into 
church polity and resolutions based thereon” for the church hierarchy’s 
determinations.56 Instead, the Court insisted, using jurisdictional language, 
that the secular courts had no authority to override a decision by church 
authorities.57 
It was key to the American diocese’s argument that the church hierarchy 
had allegedly disregarded its own rules in replacing the bishop and had 
overridden the Church’s constitution in reorganizing the dioceses. In other 
words, the diocese appeared to be claiming that the Mother Church had 
engaged in a hostile takeover of the American diocese by improperly 
replacing its leadership and restructuring its churches. Yet, in this instance, 
the Supreme Court was largely unconcerned about institutional integrity and 
appeared to favor a principle of institutional autonomy instead, suggesting 
that courts should not “inhibit[] the free development of religious 
doctrine.”58 The Court’s statement fails to acknowledge, of course, that the 
“development of religious doctrine” could be a product of hostile takeover; 
instead—in the words of the dissent—the Court chose to credit “any sheet 
of parchment bearing the ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of 
a church court.”59 In any case, the Court’s deference to the church’s internal 
decision-making structure would seem to have the virtue of maintaining the 
 
54. Id. at 697–98. 
55. Id. at 698. 
56. Id. at 708. 
57. Id. at 713 (stating that deciding the issue “would undermine the general rule that religious 
controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the 
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them” and that “ecclesiastical decisions of the 
highest church judicatories need only be accepted if the subject matter of the dispute is within their 
‘jurisdiction’”). 
58. Id. at 710 (quoting Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). 
59. Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further suggested that the Court’s 
refusal to review the underlying procedures leading to the Mother Church’s decision risked “convert[ing 












neutrality of secular courts with respect to hostile takeover; thus, whether a 
transformation occurs or does not occur, the state simply has no role and 
cannot take sides in an internal ecclesiastical dispute.60 
2. Secular Voluntary Associations 
The problem of hostile takeover arises outside the context of religious 
organizations as well. Nearly every voluntary association will profess an 
interest in its own organizational integrity—that is, in preventing 
individuals who do not subscribe to the mission or values of the organization 
from usurping that organization’s membership or leadership. For example, 
some scholars have noted the analogy between religious organizations and 
political parties with respect to the constitutional protection afforded to their 
identities, as against those who seek to compel inclusion and undermine 
their messages.61 The Court has stated that the “inclusion of persons 
unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective 
decisions—thus impairing the party’s essential functions—and that political 
parties may accordingly protect themselves ‘from intrusion by those with 
adverse political principles.’”62 And much of the precedent relied upon by 
CLS in its briefs in the Supreme Court involved the associational rights of 
non-religious voluntary associations, such as the Boy Scouts.63 
Although these secular contexts present helpful analogies, and in some 
cases provide the relevant constitutional principles regarding hostile 
takeover, it is important to recognize some significant differences. For one 
thing, political parties are engaged in a public function and therefore occupy 
a sort of middle ground with respect to their associational rights. The state 
has a stronger interest in how political parties function and therefore may 
 
60. One might also argue that one goal of the Establishment Clause is to prevent “hostile 
takeover” of civil society by religion. For example, case law forbidding government sponsorship of 
sectarian religious prayer and symbols may be aimed at preventing a symbolic takeover of secular 
government by particular religious groups. An extreme example of a religious takeover of civil society 
is the case of the Rajneesh religious community, which occupied virtually all government positions in a 
small town in Oregon in the 1980s and organized it under religious rule. See generally David E. 
Steinberg, Note, Church Control of a Municipality: Establishing a First Amendment Institutional Suit, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1363 (1986); Janice L. Sperow, Note, Rajneeshpuram: Religion Incorporated, 
36 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 928–32 (1985). This form of hostile takeover seems to me to raise very different 
questions from those discussed in this Article, concerning the state’s stance with respect to the 
transformation of voluntary private organizations, and I therefore do not discuss it here. 
61. See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 38; Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1689–90; Pamela 
S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate 
the Law of Democracy?, 83 IND. L.J. 1 (2008). Of course, this analogy is implicit in the discussion of 
the Trumpian takeover of the Republican party with which this Article begins. 
62. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (quoting 
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1952)). 












impose anti-discrimination norms upon them.64 Religious organizations do 
not usually perform public functions—although it may be argued that some 
religious organizations are sufficiently implicated in public functions or 
public funding, such that the state has an interest in enforcing anti-
discrimination norms to some degree. For example, religious hospitals and 
universities receive large amounts of public funding, and this funding may 
depend upon the religious institution’s agreement not to engage in 
discrimination, even if its doctrinal principles were to require it.65 Religious 
adoption and foster care agencies provide a service that is also provided by 
government agencies and under close state supervision.66 Thus, the state 
may have an interest in how the private organization carries out its work, 
which may at times prevail over concerns about associational integrity, 
though perhaps not to the same extent that the state is concerned with 
political parties. 
In addition, in many instances, membership in a religious group differs 
from membership in other voluntary associations because individual 
identity is often more tightly bound up with the former than the latter. 
Religious identity is experienced by many individuals as more akin to an 
immutable characteristic—such as ethnic identity or sexual orientation—
than to membership in the Kiwanis.67 Membership in a religious community 
may be inherited and unchosen, rather than purely voluntary, and family and 
social life may revolve around the religious community.68 Abandoning 
 
64. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83–84 
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927).  
65. Cf. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984) (holding that subjecting a college 
to a requirement of nondiscrimination as a condition of receiving federal funds did not violate its First 
Amendment rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). The Court specifically 
noted in Bob Jones that its holding—that a racially discriminatory university could be denied a tax 
exemption—applied specifically to religious schools and not to “churches or other purely religious 
institutions.” Id. at 604 n.29. 
66. Cf. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 160 (3d Cir. 2019) (involving a religious 
foster care agency that was carrying out a “public service pursuant to a contract with the government”), 
cert. granted, 2020 WL 871694 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123); see Flanders, supra note 38, at 115–
16. 
67. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 51 (explaining that “[w]hen a group tells a person who she is, or supplies the 
meaning of his life, the prospect of being cut off from the group is chilling,” and noting one commentator 
has given “examples of individuals who are so deeply socialized in and so closely identify with a group 
that leaving it would feel like killing off a part of themselves”). 
68. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group 
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 117 (noting that “a significant portion of an individual’s personality and 
identity often is tied to identification and interaction with a group,” such that “the threat of expulsion or 
disapproval from the group understandably exerts significant coercive pressure on individual choice”); 
see also id. at 161 n.290 (observing that, while remaining in a religious community is a voluntary choice, 
“[k]inship relationships and membership in churches that practice infant or youth baptism are both 












one’s religion simply because it does not reflect, or perhaps no longer 
reflects, one’s deeply held convictions is thus “analogous to asking a person 
to conceal his ethnic identity or to disavow his sexual orientation—perhaps 
possible, but only at a profound personal cost.”69 Although it is conceivable 
that some individuals feel the same intergenerational attachment to their 
identity as, say, Democrats or Republicans, it is probably a safe supposition 
that this phenomenon is less common in secular voluntary associations.  
C. Identifying When Hostile Takeover Is Occurring 
I have so far engaged in a largely descriptive account of hostile takeover 
as a concept with a broad set of applications in the Religion Clauses context. 
But several questions, both normative and conceptual, remain. In particular, 
echoing Justice Alito’s concern, it is reasonable to ask how we can 
determine whether hostile takeover has occurred or is occurring. That 
conceptual question, and the numerous sub-questions that it generates, are 
the topic of this section. This Part suggests that hostile takeover appears to 
have both a substantive component—in that it matters which values or 
beliefs are affected by the transformation, and why; as well as a procedural 
component—in that it matters how the takeover occurs and whether the 
institution’s own internal rules are disregarded.70 It nonetheless remains 
difficult to identify when hostile takeover is occurring, and this Part raises 
the possibility that the term is not actually a meaningful one. The next Part 
will directly address the normative question of what position the state 
should take, if any, vis-à-vis hostile takeover. 
The examples from CLS v. Martinez—of a possible real hostile takeover 
that took place before the litigation began, and of a second possible hostile 
takeover hypothesized by Justice Alito’s dissent—reveal several lacunae in 
the articulation of this concept. First, must a hostile takeover strike at the 
heart of the association’s mission and values, or does any kind of change in 
the beliefs or doctrines of the organization potentially count? For example, 
the Boy Scouts of America changed its position on gay scouts and leaders 
amidst internal strife and at least partly as a result of a change in national 
leadership the year before. This change was probably not a fundamental 
alteration in the organization’s mission or beliefs, however.71 By contrast, 
 
69. B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations, in 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 38, at 419, 426. 
70. Thanks to Chad Flanders for making this point. 
71. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 675 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Boy Scouts did not claim the exclusion of homosexuals was central to its message). After 
litigating before the Supreme Court for the right to exclude gay scoutmasters, on April 19, 2013, the 












the hypothetical scenario envisioned in CLS entails a takeover by 
individuals with not just a different or slightly more relaxed set of views, 
but rather with a set of views diametrically opposed to those of the existing 
association and its members. The original CLS could truly be said to be 
destroyed after such a process. Thus, we might ask whether a relatively 
marginal change could ever constitute a threat to associational integrity, and 
where to draw the line between a minor change and a major one. In other 
words, does the magnitude or importance of the change make the difference 
between “reform” and “transformation”?72  
The idea that the takeover must somehow strike at the heart of the 
organization’s mission or structure is an appealing one. Given that some 
doctrinal evolution over time is both expected and inevitable,73 it may make 
the most sense to be concerned only about those changes that fundamentally 
threaten a religious organization’s existence and risk eradicating it for all 
intents and purposes. But at the same time, it may not always be easy to 
determine which beliefs or structural elements are truly central to a religious 
organization’s identity. For example, the Boy Scouts had initially tried to 
suggest that the exclusion of gays and lesbians was central to its tenets, 
before later abandoning that argument.74 And if the state or the courts are 
expected to intervene to prevent hostile takeover—as discussed below—
then how are they to determine whether this is the case, given courts’ 
general discomfort with deciding questions of religious centrality?75 
The recent evolution of the Roman Catholic Church on the subject of 
divorce provides an illustration of these difficulties. The Catholic Church 
does not recognize divorce and therefore teaches that remarriage after 
divorce is adultery—which constitutes the most serious of sins.76 Because 
 
scout leaders. For a brief overview of the events leading up to this change, see Marice Richter, Boy 
Scouts Lift Blanket Ban on Gay Adult Leaders, Employees, REUTERS (July 27, 2015, 7:12 PM), https://w 
ww.reuters.com/article/usa-boyscouts/update-1-boy-scouts-lift-blanket-ban-on-gay-adult-leaders-empl 
oyees-idUSL1N1072OF20150728 [https://perma.cc/L3NP-NY36].  
72. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661, 740 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
73. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1981) (“A 
church is a complex and dynamic organization, often including believers with a variety of views on 
important questions of faith, morals, and spirituality. The dominant view of what is central to the 
religion, and of what practices are required by the religion, may gradually change. Today’s pious custom 
may be tomorrow’s moral obligation, and vice versa.” (footnote omitted)). 
74. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988) 
(rejecting the notion that courts should decide whether a belief or practice is central to a particular 
religion and arguing that doing so “would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to 
play”). 













adultery is a “mortal” sin, remarried Catholics were long excluded from 
participating in the sacrament of Communion (also referred to as receiving 
the Eucharist).77 However, Pope Francis, who assumed leadership of the 
hierarchical church in 2013, announced first in a private letter, and later in 
what he declared an official teaching entitled to deference by all Catholics, 
that not all remarried Catholics must be excluded from the Eucharist.78 This 
evolution in the Catholic Church’s teachings was highly controversial. 
While some within the church declared that Pope Francis’s new approach 
simply resurrected dormant Catholic teachings about the primacy of 
individual conscience, or that the new teaching was less radical than it 
appeared, others declared the teachings to be “heresies” that violated “the 
moral and sacramental truth of the faith.”79 Thus, although the rule that 
hostile takeover must strike at the heart of a community’s most central 
beliefs or practices is intuitively appealing, it is exceedingly difficult to 
apply, especially since religious adherents themselves often disagree over 
which beliefs are fundamental. 
Second, what makes the takeover “hostile”? Is there a difference between 
change within an organization that is organic and legitimate and change that 
is inappropriate and perverse? The idea of hostile takeover seems to imply 
a purpose or intent on the part of the agents of change to undermine the 
organization. Perhaps it even implies bad faith on the part of the usurpers. 
For example, part of what is so troubling about the hypothetical takeover 
scenario described in CLS is the apparent evil motive of the students who 
would join an organization simply to destroy it. Yet, again, the reality on 
the ground is rarely so straightforward. For example, Richard Garnett, 
discussing the role of the state with respect to doctrinal change within 
religious organizations, has observed that sometimes governments “seek to 
assimilate religious traditions’ doctrines and demands to their own,” and 
adopt particular policies with precisely this purpose.80 Do such policies 
constitute an example of the state acting in a way that facilitates hostile 
takeover, and if so, is it because of the purpose behind the policy? And does 
this imply that neutral state actions having only the incidental effect of 
encouraging particular doctrinal stances—such as, for example, tying anti-
discrimination requirements to receipt of public funds—could not constitute 
 
77. See, e.g., Tyler Arnold, Pope Francis’s Controversial Step on Communion for the Divorced 
and Remarried, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 12, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/12/pope-
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78. Id. 
79. Id.  
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facilitation of hostile takeover? A test for hostile takeover that requires an 
inquiry into purpose or subjective motivation, of course, raises the question 
of how one is to determine when the change agents are acting in bad faith 
or with improper purpose—a notoriously treacherous path to follow.81 
Third, if hostile takeover is concerned with preventing change that 
fundamentally undermines or even essentially eradicates religious 
organizations, one might be inclined to ask how we are to determine what 
is the essence of the religious organization in the first place, and in 
particular, who is entitled to define it. In other words, we might ask, “who 
is the Church?”82 Otherwise, there will be no way to tell whether 
organizational change reflects a fundamental transformation that is hostile 
to the organization or, perhaps, a return to the organization’s true mission. 
In Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, for example, did the modernist reformers or 
the traditionalists represent the “true” church? Indeed, the question of the 
religious organization’s identity has both a theoretical and a practical 
dimension. On the practical side, it is necessary to identify which entity can 
represent the church in litigation and other legal transactions. For example, 
in one recent case, a dispute arose over whether the Roman Catholic and 
Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico was the sole entity possessing a “legal 
personality,” or whether individual Catholic schools in Puerto Rico could 
also be sued for eliminating pension payments.83 The case was remanded 
because of a jurisdictional defect, but in a concurrence, Justice Alito noted 
the “difficult question[]”of “the degree to which the First Amendment 
permits civil authorities to question a religious body’s own understanding 
of its structure and the relationship between associated entities.”84 
There is also the more theoretical question of which individuals or 
entities within the religious organization should be permitted to control that 
organization’s identity and decision-making on behalf of its members. 
Supreme Court case law suggests that this question should be answered by 
considering the structure of the religious organization. In Milivojevich, the 
Court made clear that the decisions of the Mother Church—even if they 
were in violation of Church rules—should have been left alone by the 
courts, because the church structure was hierarchical and it was the Mother 
Church that had ultimate decision-making authority over matters like the 
 
81. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (“[I]t is extremely difficult for a 
court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative 
enactment.”). 
82. Karlan, supra note 61, at 9. 
83. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020). 












appointment of bishops and organizational structure.85 In other words, 
Milivojevich suggests that courts should assume a deferential stance toward 
the religious entity’s articulation of its own structure (even, presumably, 
when that articulation is one adopted in the course of litigation). To 
oversimplify a bit, within hierarchical religious associations, change has to 
come from the top down; within congregational organizations, it must come 
about through a majority vote.86  
This third question, about the identity of the church itself, implicates the 
procedural dimension of hostile takeover. It suggests that the means by 
which the organizational change occurs informs whether the transformation 
is a hostile one. One could argue that change within religious organizations 
should occur only by the means approved by the organization itself, as 
articulated by the group’s authorized decision-makers. As long as this is 
occurring, there is no hostile takeover, and the state has neither played a role 
in facilitating the change, nor is it required to help to prevent the change. 
There are at least two problems with this account, however. First, most 
apparent hostile takeover scenarios involve change that is, in fact, brought 
about through proper channels. CLS members voted to join the national 
organization. The Boy Scouts of America leadership proposed, and the 
national board voted to approve, the change in policy with respect to gay 
scout leaders. Donald Trump won the Republican nomination fair and 
square. Dissenters who refuse to follow the established procedure within an 
organization usually do not get their way; instead, they remain dissenters. 
A second problem is that this seemingly clear rule—defining the 
propriety of organizational change according to the procedure by which it 
occurs—admits of substantial ambiguity in its application. For example, in 
Milivojevich, it is true that the disputed actions concerning church 
leadership and diocesan structure were made by the highest authorities in 
the hierarchy, but the essence of the American diocese’s complaint was that 
the Mother Church had disregarded its own rules and violated the church 
constitution, and therefore that it was actually without authority to take 
those actions. Thus, as Justice Rehnquist explained in dissent, unless church 
property claims “are to be resolved by brute force,” courts will inevitably 
have to decide who is the proper authority within the religious organization 
and what its pronouncements mean.87 There is no true “hands off” position 
that the court can take when this issue arises. As Justice Rehnquist 
continued: 
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We are told that “a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions 
of church tribunals as it finds them.” But even this rule requires that 
proof be made as to what these decisions are, and if proofs on that 
issue conflict the civil court will inevitably have to choose one over 
the other. In so choosing, if the choice is to be a rational one, reasons 
must be adduced as to why one proffered decision is to prevail over 
another. Such reasons will obviously be based on the canon law by 
which the disputants have agreed to bind themselves, but they must 
also represent a preference for one view of that law over another.88 
Thus, even if institutional decision-making structures are to be respected, 
there is no escaping court involvement in essentially ecclesiastical questions 
about internal decision-making structure.  
In addition, the imperative of respecting institutional decision-making 
structures is made even more complex by the fact that those decision-
making structures—including allocation of decision-making authority—are 
often precisely the subject of the dispute. As in Milivojevich, courts can 
rarely take it for granted that all parties will be in agreement about who has 
the authority to make a particular decision; instead, parties tend to bring 
disputes to court when they believe someone has acted without authority 
and in contravention of the agreed-upon rules.89 To refuse to intervene in 
such a case is not to protect “the Church’s” associational integrity or even 
its autonomy—it is simply to preserve the status quo and allow “brute force” 
to decide the matter. As Samuel Levine has argued, “in a case of a genuine 
dispute between parties regarding church doctrine, particularly when no 
religious tribunal has rendered an opinion, the majority’s rationale [in 
Milivojevich] would not apply. In such a case, then, it would seem both 
proper and necessary for a court to adjudicate the matter.”90 At a minimum, 
courts will be required to make decisions about the decision-making and 
dispute-resolution structure of religious organizations. 
Ultimately, the idea of hostile takeover seems, like Eurydice, to recede 
the moment one looks directly at it. Perhaps “hostile takeover” is more of a 
conclusion than a premise—a label, like “judicial activism,” for doctrinal 
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change that one dislikes or considers incorrect.91 This possibility suggests 
that the concern underlying the specter of hostile takeover is not really about 
the associational integrity of religious organizations, but rather the 
competence of courts to decide ecclesiastical questions, voluntariness in 
religious organizations, or something else. At the same time, however, there 
may be a small subset of cases in which religious organizations—
particularly smaller, more vulnerable ones—are truly threatened by the 
possibility of takeover. The next Part considers whether the state ever has 
an interest in intervening, either to prevent or to facilitate such takeover. 
II. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE STATE? 
The preceding discussion suggests that associational integrity is not a 
particularly compelling concern in and of itself. Due to the Free Exercise 
Clause and related concerns about the autonomy of religious organizations, 
it is obviously problematic for the state to order a religious organization to 
accept a leader or a member not of its own choosing.92 One might 
nonetheless argue that the state itself should have no role with respect to 
encouraging or discouraging hostile takeover, and that courts should 
therefore guard against the state purposely either facilitating or preventing 
change within religious organizations. But what about adopting neutral 
rules—as in CLS—that predictably have such a result? Or what about 
adopting rules that do not coerce but strongly encourage such a result, 
through the use of subsidies and other incentives (also as in CLS)? 
These questions evoke the additional problem of determining what the 
proper baseline is for identifying when the state has acted in a way that is 
likely to effect change within religious organizations. Is the appropriate 
baseline, as Pamela Karlan suggests, “no state regulation and no state 
benefits”?93 Or on the other hand, do we have to acknowledge, as Richard 
Garnett argues, that doctrinal development can rarely be truly free of state 
interventions?94 As explained above, there is no way that courts can escape 
becoming entangled in religious questions to some extent once their 
jurisdiction has been invoked in the context of a dispute between two 
factions of a religious organization.95 It becomes difficult to determine 
exactly what positions government bodies can or should take to avoid 
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effecting internal change or empowering some groups within a religious 
organization over others. 
Various positions can be gleaned from the existing literature on the 
autonomy and integrity of religious organizations. At one extreme, Madhavi 
Sunder has argued that the law should take a generous stance toward those 
who wish to change religious organizations from within and encourage 
dissent in the name of promoting equality and justice within those 
organizations. Thus, for example, she argues that decisionmakers should 
“cease privileging the norms of religious elites and . . . instead place elites 
and dissenters on an equal footing . . . when a specific dispute is brought 
before a decisionmaker.”96 This proposal suggests that courts cannot simply 
defer to the decisions of those currently in power and must instead hear the 
claims of those seeking to make religious organizations more just. Indeed, 
Sunder recognizes that religious identity often plays a unique and 
fundamental role in individuals’ lives and identities. Thus, she suggests, 
religious organizations should make space for dissenters, allowing them to 
exercise their religion while retaining their identities.97 Under such an 
approach, for example, women who wish to militate for equal rights within 
the Roman Catholic Church would have a strong claim to retain their claim 
to Roman Catholic identity while arguing for positions at odds with official 
church dogma.98 The rights of dissenters—each one a potential participant 
in a hostile takeover—might therefore deserve more respect, and the state 
might be justified in seeking to encourage rather than discourage dissent.  
Alternately, on the other end of the spectrum, the possibility of religious 
transformation also gives rise to the prospect that members of a religious 
community might find themselves suddenly at odds with official doctrine 
that has recently changed because of hostile takeover of the institution. 
Individuals who have committed deeply both to a faith community and to 
its tenets may suffer distress, finding themselves unmoored at the prospect 
of being asked to trade in their long-held values for brand new ones. The 
potential harm to individual members of an existing religious community 
that could arise from hostile takeover could suggest a concomitant 
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obligation on the part of the state to do what it can to protect against that 
hostile takeover. 
Other possibilities lie somewhere in between. Corey Brettschneider, for 
example, argues that religious organizations should be subject to 
“democratic persuasion,” but not coercion, to encourage them to adopt 
values that are compatible with those of liberal society.99 In so doing, he 
rejects the “static” view of religious freedom which holds that the state 
should work to protect current or existing religious beliefs from state 
influence.100 Brettschneider explicitly considers institutional integrity—
which he calls a concern about “religious extinction”—but suggests that this 
concern is overstated, for two reasons.101 First, he argues that there is and 
should be a dialectic of mutual influence between a religious group and the 
democracy in which it is embedded.102 And second, he argues that there is 
no threat to religious freedom as long as the state is not acting coercively in 
nudging religious groups toward particular democratic values.103 
Brettschneider’s framework suggests, then, that an action that would replace 
a religious leader at the behest of the state is clearly problematic because it 
is coercive,104 but an action such as Hastings’s imposition of an all-comers 
rule on the student CLS group is a mere denial of a subsidy and therefore 
acceptable.105 
Taking yet another perspective on the problem, Richard Garnett argues 
that courts should avoid involvement in intrachurch disputes to the greatest 
extent possible, but not because of a concern about protecting the missions 
and beliefs of religious organizations from transformation.106 Instead, he 
argues that churches have importance as independent centers of value 
formation and inculcation that is beneficial to society, and their ability to 
perform this function without intervention from the state must be 
protected.107 Although religious organizations perform a socially valuable 
function, this aspect of churches justifies greater autonomy from the state 
rather than greater regulation, because religious organizations can only 
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perform this function of fostering and promulgating alternative value and 
belief structures if they maintain a high degree of independence from the 
state and its policy goals.108 Going further, Garnett has also argued that 
religious associations possess a “sovereignty” so deeply rooted in our 
history that the state simply lacks jurisdiction over intrachurch disputes.109 
One final possibility is that these difficult questions could be avoided 
through private ordering mechanisms. After all, corporations avoid hostile 
takeovers through contractual provisions such as “poison pills.”110 Perhaps 
religious organizations can similarly incorporate provisions into their 
governing documents that prescribe certain procedures or results (such as 
schism) in the case of particular kinds of doctrinal or structural change.111 
This approach could have the advantage of keeping state actors out of 
church property disputes and similar controversies arising from internal 
disagreements, except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances. At the 
same time, it is possible that such a solution would just push the dispute 
back to a different level, such that opposing factions would call on the courts 
to adjudicate the meaning and intent of those documents rather than 
adjudicating the original dispute. It would likely also raise substantial 
questions about the enforceability of those documents.112 
None of these approaches presents an obvious answer to the proper role 
of the state with respect to hostile takeover, beyond suggesting the relatively 
straightforward rule that states should not directly intervene in religious 
organizations to name their leaders or actively shape their membership.113 
But such actions would be forbidden by other doctrines protecting religious 
autonomy anyway. Regarding the imposition of neutral rules that lack an 
easily identifiable purpose to infringe associational integrity, however, it is 
not clear that the state should concern itself at all with whether the rule is 
likely to foster or inhibit change within those organizations. Rather, this 
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Article contends that associational integrity is in most cases not a cognizable 
interest for the state or for courts reviewing the constitutionality of legal 
rules.  
CONCLUSION 
A concern about hostile takeover of voluntary associations, and 
particularly of religious organizations, appears to animate, at least in part, 
several different First Amendment doctrines. Yet the concept of hostile 
takeover eludes straightforward definition. It appears to have both 
substantive and procedural dimensions, but it is not easy to say at what point 
organizational change has crossed the line from natural evolution to 
wholesale evisceration of an association’s fundamental values and 
principles. In addition, it is not entirely clear what attitude the state should 
assume with respect to hostile takeover—that is, whether associational 
integrity is a value worth protecting in the context of religious organizations. 
And if it is, it is not clear how the state should go about protecting it. Simple 
rules of neutrality or procedural deference do not appear to provide a way 
out.  
Ultimately, it seems that the state’s interest in associational integrity is 
highly circumscribed at best. In some instances, the courts may not be able 
to avoid intervening in internal disputes over control of church property or 
a church’s legal identity in a way that implicates questions about church 
governance. In most cases, however, rather than concerning themselves 
with protecting existing religious beliefs and hierarchies, courts should rely 
on other Religion Clauses doctrines—such as those requiring courts to avoid 
answering ecclesiastical questions and protecting the autonomy of religious 
institutions—when directly confronted with disputes concerning hostile 
takeover. 
